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This paper reviews the deeper societal and economic reasons behind the British choice of 
leaving the European Union. We address the detailed results of the referendum and the long-
standing sceptical British attitude towards European integration and then we analyse the net 
budgetary contribution that changed enormously after the Eastern Enlargement. It is argued 
that the rise in immigrant-native ratio has had a significant impact on employee’s pay level in 
certain areas, therefore pro-Brexit campaigners featured migration as one of the major 
problems arising from EU membership. Increasing income and wealth inequalities and a 
growing anti-elite sentiment in British society, coupled with the negative image of Brussels 
bureaucrats and a British approach to the rule of law that is fundamentally different from the 
continental one have also contributed to the final result of the referendum. Our analysis ends 
with a glimpse into the close future, emphasizing that the future of British-EU relations 
depends completely upon the pragmatism and wisdom of the negotiating of both sides. 
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1. REFERENDUM 
The advisory referendum on the United Kingdom’s EU membership, which took place on 23rd 
June 2016, was attended by over 33.5 million people, a turnout of 72.2% up from 66.4% at 
last year’s general election. 17.41 people million supported Brexit and 16.14 million opposed 
it – which means that 51.9% of the voters (vs. 48.1%) refused EU membership. The four 
regions making up the United Kingdom voted as follows: in England, representing 84% of 
Britain’s population, as well as in Wales, the majority chose to leave (53.4 and 52.5% of the 
votes); while in Scotland and Northern Ireland 62% and 55.8% of the voters chose to stay in 
the European integration. Turnout rates of the above mentioned regions were 73.0%, 71.7%, 
67.2%, and 62.7% respectively (BBC 2016). 
Although the referendum had only advisory status (i.e. not legally binding), its result is taken 
most seriously by national authorities and institutions both in the UK and abroad – and all act 
accordingly. Therefore a second vote is highly unlikely, just like Scotland (or Northern 
Ireland) keeping their EU membership somehow if Britain leaves. Since several member 
states worry about secessionist trends (e.g. Spain), they are not likely to encourage or agree to 
the precedent of swift accession of successor states to the EU in case the United Kingdom 
disintegrates. 
As for the structure of votes cast – that is, who voted yes and who voted no – the only credible 
source is that of geographical data. The reason is that no public service broadcaster (e.g. BBC, 
ITV, SKY) carried out a comprehensive exit poll (a poll of voters taken immediately after 
they have exited the polling stations) – although this is common practice after general 
elections.1 Therefore, exit polls commissioned by private entities (e.g. banks) are not 
representative, and assumptions based on them lack professional credibility. And so do 
conclusions drawn on these non-representative exit polls (pl. McGill 2016) and published on 
social and mass media sites as if rural, elderly and relatively less qualified voters were to 
blame for Brexit.  
However, we can draw at least two conclusions based on geographical data. The first one: in 
London and better off, bigger cities like Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Belfast 
and in some education/research centres profiting from their international character (Oxford, 
Cambridge) as well as in nearby areas, the majority of voters stood by Remain. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
1 The reason: no exit polls were carried out after a referendum held on a similar question 41 years earlier; 
therefore there was no baseline against which to measure how people have voted this time. Without that, it 
would have been a hard and expensive task to define a polling station sample representing the whole country.  
urbanism in itself was no guarantee for backing the integration – in regions hit by de-
industrialization (Birmingham, Sheffield), results were opposite.  
The second one: traditional opposition against economic, political and cultural dominance of 
England persists. Scotland’s entire history is about this opposition, so it was small wonder 
that 62% of Scots preferred remaining part of the EU. In Northern Ireland where 55.8% voted 
for Remain, this ratio was even higher in arias dominated by Catholics. In Wales, where 52% 
voted for Brexit, in some Western regions with majority of population still knowing and 
speaking the Welsh language, Remain voters outnumbered those opposing the integration.  
2. BACKGROUND 
British EU phobia is practically as old as their membership – to be precise as the negotiations 
clarifying accession conditions – and is rooted in the historical tradition of „Divide et impera” 
principle applied to British European politics. Organizing a referendum whether exiting or 
remaining a member of the then European Economic Community already in 1975, a mere two 
years after Britain’s accession tells a lot about its attitude. That referendum (and the 
renegotiation of terms of entry) was promised by the Labour Party, due to their fear that 
taking over protectionist common agricultural policy (CAP) would lead to growing food 
prices (they were right as it later turned out) and that limited economic sovereignty would 
prevent them from initiating a socialist style voluntarist industrial policy. Finally, two-thirds 
of voters chose to remain part of the common European project at the time (Perisic 2010). 
When looking for the origins of difficulties related to European integration, one must bear in 
mind that the UK was not a founding member. When it entered, the European integration 
already had had its own institutional arrangement, several common policies, e.g. common 
commercial and agricultural policies, the regulations of which had been elaborated and 
codified ignoring British interests completely. It soon became clear that the country could 
only continue its membership if granted special, exceptional rights in several areas. 
Accordingly, although the United Kingdom is not the only country where EU legislation 
applies selectively, with opt-out rights (i.e. opting for not taking part) in four key areas, it is 
the member state with the most exemptions in the EU28.   
First of all, the country does not take part in the third phase of the economic and monetary 
union. Therefore most monetary policy decrees arising from EU contracts as well as several 
economic and budgetary rules do not apply in it. As stated in the 15th Protocol of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, London cannot 
be obliged and does not make commitments to introduce the euro (EUR-LEX 2016). It has its 
own monetary policy defined by the Bank of England. Although the UK takes part in 
procedures to harmonize and supervise economic and budgetary policies (e.g. Stability and 
Growth Pact or European Semester), it does so with significantly lighter conditions than other 
member states do, as coercive mechanisms and sanctions do not apply in case it breaches 
these procedures. Accordingly, the UK does not have to avoid but only “shall endeavour to 
avoid” extreme budgetary deficit. As the country was not limited by European Central Bank 
and European System of Central Banks decisions, it could, following the 2008 crisis, 
introduce quantitative easing much earlier than Eurozone members. 
The other side of the coin is that the United Kingdom (at least directly) has no say in 
Eurozone matters, and has no right to participate in the appointment of the European Central 
Bank’s management body which makes it relatively isolated in the EU and increases the risk 
of it missing out on key decisions related to the future of the integration. It is to be mentioned 
here that London has not signed economic governance strengthening documents of great 
importance in recent years, like the Fiscal Pact or agreements on the European stability 
mechanism or a key element of Europe's banking union, the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
The second key opt-out relates to the Schengen Cooperation, enabling citizens of the 
participating countries to cross internal borders without being subjected to checks and 
formalities, and applying common rules at the area’s external borders (e.g. common visa 
policy). At the same time, the whole area of the British Isles (UK, Ireland, the Isle of Man and 
the Channel Islands) belongs to the so-called Common Travel Area where member countries’ 
citizens can move freely with minimal requirements regarding official documents (i.e. without 
passport or visa, and in the absence of a formal ID card even a driver’s licence may do it) (CI 
2016). This means that the UK and Ireland, the two EU members not taking part in the 
Schengen Cooperation, run their own mini-Schengen.  
The third opt-out worth mentioning here is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that the 
United Kingdom originally did not sign due to its incompatibility with British labour law. 
When the Charter became part of the Treaty of Lisbon, a special protocol (Protocol No. 30) 
had to be annexed stating that the Court of Justice of the European Union cannot deem British 
laws (regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action) inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles specified in the Charter – in particular concerning 
labour, family, health, environment and consumer protection issues as defined under the Title 
IV (Solidarity) (Foreign and Commonwealth Office London 2016: 310-311). 
Finally the fourth opt-out concerns justice and home affairs of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
According to the relevant protocol, the United Kingdom is free to choose to participate in 
justice and home affairs cooperation on a case-by-case basis. Opt-out is not final, since the 
country can change its mind and opt back in at any time, but in case it decides to cooperate, it 
cannot opt-out again (Ibid:292-295). 
Originally, there was a fifth opt-out too, since the British government refused to sign the 
social chapter of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, covering such areas as worker’s pay, health and 
safety. But following the landslide victory of the Labour Party in 1997, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair abolished this opt-out immediately after coming to power.  
Furthermore, in addition to the above-mentioned opt-outs, there were two more areas, the EU 
budget and the free movement of workers, which – in spite of all the negotiated exemptions 
and benefits for the UK – inevitably appeared as drawbacks of EU membership during the 
Brexit campaign.  
3. NET BUDGETARY CONTRIBUTION 
As already mentioned, on the eve of British accession the Labour leadership had promised 
that, if returned to office at the 1974 general elections, they would renegotiate the British 
terms of entry secured by the Conservatives. The renegotiation took place as early as during 
the 1974 December summit in Paris, and the Labour cabinet achieved results in two main 
areas. First, with effect from 1st January 1975, the European Regional Development Fund, 
designed to correct regional imbalances resulting from agricultural predominance, industrial 
change and structural under-employment, had been set up for overtly political reasons; its 
resources were divided in a way the UK received above average transfers in the first years 
(European Communities 1974:10). Second, a principle was adopted whereby European 
institutions were obliged to find a fair solution, i.e. elaborate a generally applicable criteria-
based correction mechanism, in case an „unacceptable” situation would arise when 
formulating the common budget. 
Those results were then relativized by history: by the time the Regional Fund’s budget has 
gained importance, regions far more underdeveloped than those of the United Kingdom 
qualified for most of its sources due to the Mediterranean (and later on Eastern) enlargement. 
The general correction mechanism also failed to materialize.2 
Britain’s excessive net contribution to the EU budget was (and is still being) caused by two 
factors: the country received too little sources from the common funds, and had to contribute 
too much to them. This situation was due to the fact that the founding members decided upon 
the structure of the common budget several years before the British accession. On the 
expenditure side, agricultural policy dominated – which, considering their 60-70% self-
sufficiency in food, made the British to start form an already compromised position. The 
revenue side was first made up of mostly customs and agricultural levies, and then, from the 
end of the 1970s, the VAT-based resource gradually became predominant. Surely, the UK, 
having traditionally strong trade links outside the EU, used to pay more or less the same 
amount of customs to the common budget as Germany did, and twice as much as France did, 
considering that in terms of imports Germany used to be a one and a half time more important 
trader, while France trader of similar magnitude. The problem with the VAT-based source 
was different: the tax base represented a larger part of GNP in Britain than in other, more 
prosperous member states.3 In order to mitigate its budgetary problems, the UK received 
annual compensation from 1980 on, the sum of which being determined as a result of a long-
lasting bargaining process (European Communities 1980). A final solution was agreed upon at 
the 1984 Fontainebleau summit where the British delegation, led by Margaret Thatcher, was 
granted a regular budgetary correction (rebate) based on a special formula on an exclusive 
basis to the UK (European Council 1985). From 1986 onwards, the United Kingdom became 
entitled to be reimbursed, by way of a reduction in its VAT-based payments, 66 % of the 
difference between its share in VAT-bases and its share in total allocated expenditure, applied 
to total allocated expenditure (European Commission 2008). Furthermore, demonstrating the 
success of British diplomacy, the British rebate became part of the so-called ORS (Own 
                                                          
2 There were two attempts to introduce a general correction mechanism. The first one (mechanism of dynamic 
brakes) was formally in force (1976-80), but did not operate in practice, because the three conditions (GDP per 
capita lower than 85%, rate of economic growth less than 120% of the Community average, and share in the 
common budget more than 10% higher than share in Community GDP) necessary for its initiation were never 
met at the same time in one member country (European Commission 1998). The other attempt or system, GCM 
(generalized correction mechanism) suggested by the Commission, would have resulted in Member States being 
entitled to a rebate which is triggered when their contribution to the EU budget reaches a threshold of 0.35% of 
GNI. The refund would have been in form of a 66% abatement of the Member State's net contribution above the 
threshold. This system has never even been introduced formally since it would have made little difference in 
most members but it would have worsened British positions a lot (European Commission 2004). 
3 VAT contributions are generally considered to be regressive (i.e. not good indicators of Member States’ ability 
to pay), as VAT base tends to represent a higher percentage of GNP/GNI in poorer than in richer EU members 
(European Commission 1998b).  
Resources System), ensuring the revenue side of the common European budget. As, by virtue 
of Article 311 of the Treaty, any changes made to this system require the unequivocal consent 
of all member states and the EP has merely a consultative power in the issue, the British were 
given veto power regarding their own correction mechanism.  
The original sum of the British rebate was always corrected later on – reflecting changes in 
the ORS.  The principle was to neutralize all positive or negative changes affecting the UK’s 
financial position.  
 
Figure 1 
Largest net contributors to the EU budget: Operating budgetary balances – excluding 
administrative expenditure and TOR, and including UK correction (% GNI)) 
 
TOR = traditional own resources (duties, sugar levies) Operating budgetary balance for a given MS = difference 
between allocated operating expenditure (i.e. excluding administration) and own resources payments (excluding 
TOR). B,A,S,NL = Belgium, Austria, Sweden, The Netherlands – Source: European Commission (2016)  
 
The rebate worked without problems for cca. 10 years, then, from the second half of the 
1990s, circumstances and conditions that led to its elaboration started to change. On the one 
hand, the role of agricultural policy in the common budget decreased, and due to its 
successive reforms, British farmers received larger sums than before anyway. On the other 
hand, thanks to the outstanding economic growth of the two decades following 1985 (at least 
when compared to other European countries), by the early 2000s, the British outstripped all 
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their important European partners in terms of GDP (at purchasing power parity) per capita 
(Knoema 2016), which obviously affected their contributive capacity in a positive way. These 
changes were increasingly reflected in an improvement of the British net position within the 
common budget (European Commission 2002).4  
Since the British were not willing to give up on the rebate, the other member states could only 
„compensate for the damage” by redistributing the financial burden among themselves, and 
by the first decade of the 21st century, considering the older, better off members of the EU, 
the United Kingdom bore a disproportionately low budgetary burden compared to its 
economic performance (Figure 1).  
This relatively favourable situation for the British was upset by the Eastern Enlargement, 
which in itself – based on EU money to be spent in new member states, hence to be taken into 
account when calculating the correction – would have automatically and significantly 
increased the amount of British rebate. London simply could not get away politically with 
making new members pay for part of its increased rebate, while not taking its due part in 
funding the catching up process of these very same countries to European standards. Finally, 
at the December 2005 summit, closing the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 
negotiations at the time, the Blair cabinet agreed to exclude from the calculation most 
enlargement-related expenditure (with the notable exception of CAP direct payments, market-
related expenditure, and part of rural development funds), so as to share the burden of Eastern 
Enlargement by ceding (with a progressive phasing-in of the change from 2009 onwards) 
€10.5 billion from its rebate of the 2007-2013 period (European Council 2005). 
The effect of partial renouncement on rebate became manifest from 2010 onward. Figure 1 
shows that regarding its operative balance, the United Kingdom reached the average level of 
partner countries within a couple of years, and integrated swiftly into the group of average net 
contributors. On the mathematical level, comparing data for 2004-2009 and 2010-2015, this 
means that a deterioration of approximately €5 billion took place in the British net budgetary 
position due to the Eastern enlargement. The British (together with France) became the 
second-third most important net contributors of the EU (second with a great difference if we 
take into account the customs payments) after Germany (European Commission 2016). 
                                                          
4 In the period of 2001-2008, the UK was second (after Finland) among the 11 richer (i.e. no cohesion) countries 
of the EU15, to contribute the least to the common budget in terms of average net operating balance. 
Figure 1 also reveals that without rebate, the UK's net contribution as a percentage of gross 
national income would be twice of France's (i.e. a comparably wealthy country) and 1.5 times 
higher than Germany's, hence Britain would be by far the biggest net payer to the EU budget. 
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the question of making further cuts to the 
rebate was not even raised at the subsequent 2014-2020 MFF negotiations. At the end of the 
latter event, overshadowed by the global crisis, the European leaders agreed to an 
unprecedented real-terms cut in the budget payment limit for the seven-year period of 2014-
2020, which means that for the first time in the history of medium-term financial planning, 
introduced in 1988, there has been a reduction in spending vis-à-vis the previous MFF. The 
British government literally celebrated the MFF-agreement; beyond protecting the remnants 
of the rebate and reducing the overall budget ceilings, the UK delegation also managed to 
bring changes in MFF expenditure structure in line with the British interests. Based on these 
achievements, between 2014 and 2020, sources of those budgetary headings will decrease, 
e.g. cohesion (-8.4%), common agricultural policy market pillar (-17.5%), in which the UK 
usually has a relatively lower share, and funds for those headings will increase, like 
competitiveness (+37.3%) and research and development (+40%), from which British firms 
and universities are particularly well placed to benefit. These changes prevent the further 
deterioration of the British budgetary position, but we can only measure the rate of 
improvement post factum. The close-to-balance situation prevailing prior to the Eastern 
enlargement will certainly not return (European Council 2013).  
One must note that the British attitude to MFF, the determination to fight for decreasing the 
budget, and the widely mediatised daily criticism against Brussels post-Brexit seems to have 
been too ”successful”. The presentation of the tasks of European institutions and the opulent 
wages – e.g. that numerous Brussels bureaucrats have higher net incomes than the British 
Prime Minister – resulted in an extremely negative public image of the European Union in 
Great Britain (e.g. Waterfield 2014).5 As if they were trying to prove to British citizens that a 
large part of their ever-increasing contribution is being used prodigally. This disadvantageous 
image of the Brussels elite was reinforced by the British claim on reforming the Union that 
was constantly present during the Cameron era. Cameron’s team also floated the idea that in 
case no reform takes place, the Prime Minister will campaign for Brexit. At the very least, 
communicating integration problems this way backfired on Great Britain’s political 
leadership. 
                                                          
5 Stating that more than one in five EU officials earn above the UK PM’s salary.  
4. IMMIGRATION 
The other key element of the Brexit campaign was immigration. The effects of inward and 
outward migration flows more or less offset each other in the United Kingdom during most of 
the 20th century. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, outward flows were often greater than 
inward ones. Since 1994, however, the number of people migrating to the UK has constantly 
surpassed that of emigrants, and from 1998 onward, immigration has in each year exceeded 
emigration by more than one hundred thousand (Hawkins 2016).  
Immigration gained further momentum after the 2004 Enlargement. The United Kingdom 
(together with Sweden and Ireland) was among the few old member states to open their labour 
market without restrictions to new member countries’ workers. (Nota bene: in 2007, when 
Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union, the UK changed its approach and opted for delaying 
labour market access of nationals from these two countries until 2014.) Net immigration 
reaches 200 thousand regularly every year since 2004, and since December 2014 – based on 
data of the last twelve months – it amounts to an annual 300 thousand (Hawkins 2016: 9-10).  
Figure 2 
Immigrant native ratio and composition of immigrants by region of origin in UK  
 
Note: In the period of 2011-2015, among the top 6 countries of origin for EU migrants we can find Poland with 
818,000 persons in 2015 (a change of +203,000 since 2011), Romania 223,000 (+136,000), Spain with 137,000 
(+74,000), Italy with 176,000 (+50,000), Hungary with 96,000 (+46,000), and Portugal with 140,000 (+44,000). 
(The Migration Observatory 2016) Source: Nickell – Saleheen 2015 
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Accelerated immigration increased the so-called immigrant-native ratio. This ratio measures 
the number of 16-64 year olds (i.e. the working age population) born outside the UK divided 
by the number born in the UK. The ratio was stable at around 8% between 1984 and 1995; it 
grew sharply since then and rose to nearly 20% by December 2014, indicating that nowadays 
every sixth potential employee is a foreigner (Figure 2).6 
 
Figure 3 
Non-UK nationals working in the UK (thousands) 
 
Notes: All data refers to the period of April to June of each year. As for the year ending June 2016, among the 
top 5 EU nationalities asking for National Insurance number (NINo) registrations, we can find Romanians 
(185,000), Poles (105,000), Italians (59,000), Spaniards (48,000) and Bulgarians (40,000). Out of all NINo 
registrations, 23.4% were non-EU origin, 76.6% were from within the EU, of which 27.8 from old member states 
(MS), 21.1 from the 8 new MS of the 2004 enlargement and 27.2% from the 2 new MS of 2007 enlargement (i.e. 
Romania and Bulgaria). Source: UK Labour Market 2016:13 
 
As of today, politics has been unable to curb immigration, especially the inflow of those 
coming from EU member states in search of work (Figure 3). Cameron himself failed to keep 
his 2010 election promise of reducing the number of immigrants to a few tens of thousands 
per annum. During the 2015 election campaign, he reinforced his promise by pledging to 
                                                          
6 There are several definitions for the term ‘migrant’. He or she can be someone whose country of birth or 
nationality is different from their country of residence. While the immigrant-native ratio, which refers to those 
born outside the UK, rose close to 20% by the end of 2014, the proportion of non-UK nationals working in the 
UK increased from 3.7% to 10.9% between 1997 and 2016. The difference in the order of magnitude comes 
mainly from the fact that the estimates for people born abroad but working in the UK include many UK 
nationals. (Office for National Statistics 2016) 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Total EU nationals Total non-EU nationals
reduce net migration into Britain to below 100,000 (e.g. through radical measures against 
illegal immigration and by delaying eligibility to housing and other welfare benefits or even 
levying, in the case of non-EU immigrants, a charge for their use of the NHS services), but 
failed again (Chorley 2015; Conservative Party Manifesto 2015). Immigration has, by its 
sheer size, placed considerable strain on the country’s infrastructure,7 having a significant 
impact on a range of public services, “from queue for social housing… to hospital, maternity 
and GP services as well as education, public transport, the environment and the general 
transport infrastructure”(Migration Watch 2016).   
The Bank of England published an analysis in December 2015, proving that the rise of the 
immigrant-native ratio in a given region has a significant small impact on employee’s pay 
level. This effect is the biggest in the semi/unskilled services where a 10 percentage point rise 
of the ratio is associated with a 2% reduction in wages (Nickell – Saleheen 2015). Moreover, 
the ratio stands at 10-15% in all important sectors of the economy, reaching even higher 
levels in some sectors or professions: e.g. in health services, work of process operatives, and 
elementary services it hits 25-30%, while in textile and printing trades and elementary trades 
it reaches a stunning 35-45%. The immigrant-native ratio is also high for professional 
workers; nowadays every fifth highly-qualified employee (e.g. engineers) is a foreigner.  
Immigration has been growing across all occupations, but the lower the skills, the sharper the 
rise. To give a typical illustration, between mid-1990s and mid-2010s, the immigrant-native 
ratio grew by 6 percentage points for managers and by 28 for elementary jobs. While in the 
early 1990s, the pattern of immigration across occupation took a shallow U-shape, as the 
number of highly qualified and unskilled foreign employees exceeded those in middle skilled 
occupations, in recent years the pattern tends to be higher in lower skilled jobs (Ibid:9-10). 
And this brings us closer to the core of the problem caused by the new trends in immigration. 
While between 1993 and 2005, median hourly earnings of UK natives and EU-born migrants 
were completely overlapping, after 2005, the two curves started to diverge sharply and a cca. 
15-20% wide scissors opened, indicating clearly higher wages for British natives (Figure 2 in: 
Nickell – Saleheen 2015:7). This break in the trend of EU-born migrants’ earnings was due to 
the massive inflow of people from new member states with significantly lower wage levels 
than in the EU15. The Eastern Enlargement has largely added to the number of those low-
                                                          
7 According to a Home Office analysis, each immigrant costs UK taxpayers up to £8,350 a year in healthcare, 
education, and benefits bills. (The Telegraph 2013) 
skilled, low-waged workers whose bulk had arrived earlier to the UK from the Indian 
subcontinent. Those 8 countries who gained EU membership in 2004 (i.e. new member states 
minus Malta and Cyprus) received the same weekly earnings in the UK in 2008 as migrants 
from Pakistan or Bangladesh (Office for National Statistics 2008:3). Mass migration from 
new member states has not only had a small negative impact on average wages, but has also 
certainly (regionally and depending on occupational groups) displaced local nationals from 
their jobs. They were replaced by Eastern European migrants willing to work either for lower 
pay or under inferior conditions than British natives (Conway 2014:70). 
Although at the beginning, pro-Brexit campaigners concentrated on issues of economic 
sovereignty rather than migration, by the end of the campaign, migration became such an 
overwhelming problem that they could not let the opportunity slip away by not addressing the 
issue.  
5. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
We could add a long list of problems contributing to Brexit, but we must not forget three 
rather general factors associated with long-term trends that were reinforced in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis. While the first two factors relate to the British elite’s way of 
thinking about sovereignty and constitutional arrangements, the third one is associated with 
the mounting discontent of large social strata over increasing income and wealth inequalities.  
Let us start with the first factor. As the European Union has always been more than a group of 
cooperating countries, its members pooling a significant part of their sovereignty into 
supranational institutions, the British were only interested in membership until a certain 
balance of power could be maintained, with Paris and Bonn/Berlin being the main engines of 
the integration and London playing its traditional role to keep these powers balanced.  
The first rupture in this balance took place when the two parts of Germany reunited at the end 
of the1980s. Germany became by far the largest economic power within the EU. Also, the 
monetary union has been accomplished on German terms, with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) having its headquarters in Frankfurt and price stability as its central goal. Thanks to the 
economic reforms consisting of a radical reshaping of the welfare state and reducing labour 
costs during Schröder’s second term between 2002 and 2005 (i.e. just in time to “be ready” 
before crisis), Germany emerged from the global crisis even stronger and the balance of 
power between Paris and Berlin seems to have been lost for long. As responses to the 
Eurozone crisis were designed to fit into German economic policy standards (closer union, 
more austerity), Britain started to face increasing pressure either to join the Eurozone 
dominated by Germany to be able to influence more decisions or leave the EU completely 
(Conway 2014). A significant part of the British elite viscerally rejects the vision of such 
extreme pooling of sovereignty, especially if it means “being bossed by” Germans dominating 
the integration (Lawson 1990).8  
The second general factor leading to Brexit finds its roots in British political culture, whose 
fundamental principle has, since the Civil War, been the repudiation of absolutism; 
absolutism in the sense of ruling by decree, i.e. with the sovereign decreeing the law without 
having to discuss it with Parliament. The British approach to the rule of law conflicts with the 
continental tradition, in which the executive power is expected to issue legally binding 
decrees, creating subordinate legislation. The latter system of exercising administrative power 
– i.e. the practice of compelling lower ranking bureaucrats to benefit or disadvantage 
individuals, without the authorities being obliged to give explanation – opens the door to 
cronyism and contradicts British common law notions of procedural fairness. While the law-
making activities of the Commission are viewed with distrust in Britain, continental 
Europeans view them as nothing more than an extension of the normal doings performed by 
national bureaucrats to the community level. A final and irrevocable integration of the UK 
into a unified Europe would certainly require substituting the British concept of rule of law 
for continental administrative law tradition. The British people’s adherence to the tradition of 
democratic accountability was probably the most important argument against the maintenance 
of membership in an ever more integrated EU (James 2016). 
The third general factor behind Brexit vote stems from the increase of income and wealth 
inequalities. The British economy fares well – at least compared to the majority of the 
developed market economies – in vain if millions of citizens do not perceive it. Although 
technological development pervades the entire society – and even beggars can have a mobile 
phone – but the trickle-down effect has not kicked in: rich people get richer and the situation 
of the poor is not necessarily improving. Politicians praise the benefits of European 
integration, but to no avail to the masses of the unemployed, marginalized from the job 
                                                          
8 One can illustrate this by the saying of a late Conservative Party politician, Nicholas Ridley: “When it comes to 
apply more squeeze to the economy or let it up a bit, it is about political accountability… and being bossed by a 
German would cause absolute mayhem in the UK”(quoted in Lawson 1990:9). 
market (i.e. being locked into flexible and/or precarious employment) (Loverifge – Mok 
1979; Sirovátka 1997) and excluded from social benefits for different reasons.  
The way developed countries’ governments handled the global financial crisis – that is, 
instead of those responsible, placing the burden of consequences on the society as a whole – 
has not only further increased income, wealth (and opportunity) inequalities, but has led to 
widespread anti-elite sentiments too. We can rightfully assume that when 51.9% of the 
population voted for Brexit, they did not say no to the EU-membership of their country in the 
first place, but expressed their anger and desperation over their constantly deteriorating 
situation and concern over their children facing a future with even worse prospects. The 
referendum results should warn decision-makers to take urgent steps in order to ensure that 
the benefits of future growth are enjoyed by all (Pisani et al. 2016:2). 
6. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE BRING? 
The least we can say is that there is a huge amount of uncertainty regarding the consequences 
of Brexit. However, if there is something the business world cannot really stand is 
uncertainty: concerning both the future relationship with the EU and the journey to get there. 
So, it is little wonder that in order to reassure both the business world and the public, PM 
Cameron hurried to give a statement in the House of Commons only four days after the vote. 
In his speech, he described the UK as being one of the strongest among major advanced 
economies, with low, stable inflation, highest ever rate of employment, and budget deficit 
forecasted to be below 3% in 2016. He also emphasized that the financial system was, as for 
the banks’ stress tests, substantially more resilient than half a dozen years earlier, with capital 
requirements 10 times higher than before the crisis, and the Bank of England standing ready 
to provide more than £250 billion of additional funds to support banks and markets (PM 
statement 2016). 
As far as the relation between the UK and the EU is concerned, nothing has changed for the 
time being. Not the slightest limitations have been placed on any of the four freedoms, i.e. the 
free movement of goods, services, capitals, and persons. Foreigners working and studying in 
the country, just like British citizens living in other EU member states, can continue studying, 
working, and spending their pensioner years in the chosen EU country as before. Equally, 
London is obliged to continue paying its budgetary contribution to the common budget. 
Largely: as long as exit negotiations are ongoing, rights and obligations arising from EU 
membership remain in effect.  
As for the technicalities of the withdrawal procedure, by invoking Article 50 of the Treaty, the 
UK will have to notify the European Council of its intention to leave. Although there is no set 
timeframe for when it has to do so, the notification is likely to be announced by the end of the 
first semester of 2017.9 The negotiation period lasts two years counting from the formal 
notification and can only be extended by a unanimous decision of all the other 27 EU 
countries. The aim of the negotiations is to conclude a withdrawal agreement, containing 
detailed withdrawal arrangements and transition provisions considering the framework for the 
UK’s future relationship with the EU, to be adopted by the Council by qualified majority after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (Miller – Lang 2016:4). If there is no 
agreement, WTO rules on most-favoured-nation status will apply to UK goods and services 
sold within the Single Market and vice versa (Davis 2016).  
In spite of the fact that only a few months have passed since the Brexit vote, a multitude of 
recent papers have been devoted to finding out which model (e.g. Norwegian, Swiss or 
Canadian model) of partnership between the UK and the EU would be most suitable for either 
or both sides.10 If none of the existing models are convenient, it is because none of them are 
able to tackle the UK’s dilemma of how to retain untrammelled access to the Single Market – 
from the “passporting rights”11 for the financial services to the technical specifications of 
mechanical goods – while restricting the number of European migrant workers as well as 
considerably reducing contribution to the EU budget.  
Of course, all guesswork is meaningless regarding the nature of future British-EU relations 
since those will be defined during negotiations. And it should not be forgotten that the 
                                                          
9 Eager to avoid a lengthy period of uncertainty and a domino effect among other Eurosceptic member states, the 
EU27 want the UK out before the up-coming EP elections in June 2019, and before talks on the next MFF get 
underway (the current EU budget cycle ending in 2020) (Grant 2016). 
10 One of the most interesting papers, written by five authors (Pisani et al. 2016), proposes a new form of 
relationship (called “continental partnership” or CP), less deep than membership, but closer than a simple FTA, 
which would consist of participating in goods/services/capital and also some temporary labour mobility, as well 
as of a new intergovernmental decision-making system, and would involve some contribution to the EU budget 
and a close cooperation on foreign policy, security, and defence. In such a partnership, the UK would have a say 
on EU policies, but ultimate authority would formally remain with the EU. Resulting in a Europe with an inner 
circle of deeply integrated countries and an outer one with less integration, the CP also could, in the long-run, be 
an attractive model for Switzerland (she too wishing to limit free movement) and serve as a solution for 
structuring relations with Turkey, Ukraine, and other countries (ibid:1; 6:9). 
11 Passports covering a wide range of activities (including retail banking, insurance, and investment services) 
allow companies licenced in one EU member state to provide financial services across the EU. Although there 
are more companies relying on passporting to do business in the UK than the other way round, which would 
have us believe that the EU has as much to lose from restricting UK access to the Single Market as the UK does, 
the total number of passports held by UK companies (allowing them to do business in all EEA countries) 
exceeds over 14-fold the number of passports held by European businesses (allowing them to do business only in 
Britain). (Arnold 2016) 
negotiating position of the British government is still far from being moulded. In late 
September 2016, the Department for Exiting the European Union was still actively recruiting 
its staff in order to prepare for organising round tables and bilateral discussions with key 
stakeholders in cca. 50 different sectors, with the aim of asking data and submissions from 
them. At the end of the process, on the basis of sectoral assessments, a global strategy will be 
prepared (Davis 2016).  
What the negotiators of both sides must not forget is that a good deal of pragmatism and 
wisdom could save a lot of suffering and disruption. The tight 4 percent Brexit vantage of the 
referendum does not entitle the British government to ignore all results achieved in the EU, 
and it is not in the interest of the EU either to move negotiations in that direction. The UK 
runs a trade deficit in goods and a trade surplus in services with the European Union, with the 
surplus in the trade in services not making up for the trade deficit in goods, meaning that for 
the EU, the United Kingdom is a more important market than the other way around. In 2014, 
UK trade deficit with EU member states was largest with Germany (£28bn), but also 
significant (£6-9bn) with France, Belgium/Luxemburg, Spain, and Italy (UK Perspectives 
2016). So, in case of these countries, threatening to punish some elements of British industry 
would entail threatening their own industries. On the other hand, concerning the financial 
services, an early consensus was forming recently around a figure of about 20% (or £9bn) for 
the amount of investment banking and capital markets revenue that faces disruption in the 
worst case scenario (Arnold 2016). 
7. CLOSING REMARKS 
Brexit is the result of long-maturing processes of economic and social development 
reinforcing each other. A significant part of the British elite – raised on imperial tradition with 
a global mindset and with attitudes deeply rooted in their specific political culture – could 
never embrace European integration wholeheartedly, or confine their ambitions to the pursuit 
of regional interests. The British have always been leading advocates of free trade; in case the 
European cooperation exceeded this level, they either skipped it (euro zone, Schengen) or 
tried to slow it down. The sharp (and often legitimate) criticism voiced by British leaders 
against Brussels bureaucracy found a receptive audience in various strata of society.  
Meanwhile, globalisation reached the average British citizens: in line with contemporary 
economics principles, the production of goods they consumed shifted to a foreign country if 
manufacturing was cheaper there, and if they complained about it or did not want to take low-
paid jobs, they were easy to replace with someone from abroad. The free outward movement 
of capital and inward movement of labour both hit the average British citizens. The negative 
effects of growing income and wealth inequalities were then reinforced by the successive 
waves of the Eastern Enlargement and the global financial crisis. As all these processes and 
attempts to resolve the accompanying problems (e.g. by austerity measures) have seriously 
affected average people’s life, the appeal for political populism inevitably strengthened.   
The referendum on EU membership was far from the mere technical issue of whether staying 
or leaving the integration – to most British citizens it was a desperate and legitimate answer to 
British and European (especially Brussels) elite politics that had discredited themselves. Will 
the elite learn from the result, will they reach a reasonable conclusion? If so, then exit 
negotiations might well result in a compromise acceptable for both parties, and neither the 
British economy, nor the European integration should suffer negative consequences due to 
Brexit.  
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